Currently, there is a significant interest in the problem of influence maximization. In economics, it is well accepted that adoption of items is governed by the utility that a user derives from their adoption. In this paper, we propose a model called EPIC that combines utility-driven item adoption with the viral network effect helping to propagate adoption of and desire for items from users to their peers. We focus on the case of mutually complementary items and model their adoption behavior via supermodular value functions. We assume price is additive and use zero mean random noise to capture the uncertainty in our knowledge of user valuations. In this setting, we study a novel problem of social welfare maximization: given item budgets, find an optimal allocation of items to seed nodes that maximizes the sum of expected utilities derived by users when the diffusion terminates. We show the expected social welfare is monotone but neither submodular nor supermodular. Nevertheless, we show that a simple greedy allocation can ensure a (1−1/e− )-approximation to the optimum. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first instance where for a non-submodular objective in the context of viral marketing, such a high approximation ratio is achieved. We provide the analysis of this result, which is highly nontrivial and along the way we give a solution to the prefix-preserving influence maximization problem, which could be of independent interest. With extensive experiments on real and synthetic datasets, we show that our algorithm significantly outperforms all the baselines.
Introduction
Motivated by applications such as viral marketing, study of propagation of infections, and social feed ranking, the problem of influence maximization has been extensively studied in the literature [8] . The seminal paper of Kempe et al. [24] was the first to formulate influence maximization (IM) as a discrete optimization problem: given a directed graph G = (V, E, p), with nodes V , edges E, a function p : E → [0, 1] associating influence weights with edges, a stochastic diffusion model M , and a number k, select a set S ⊂ V of at most k seed nodes such that by activating the nodes S, the expected number of nodes of G that get activated under M is maximized. Two fundamental diffusion models are independent cascade (IC) and linear threshold (LT) [24] . Most of the work on IM has focused on a single item or phenomenon propagating through the network, and has developed efficient and scalable heuristic and approximation algorithms for IM [3, 10-13, 17, 39, 43, 44] .
Subsequently, researchers have studied multiple campaigns propagating through a network [2, 4-7, 18, 28, 29,40] . Among these, the majority of studies have concentrated on items, products, or campaigns competing with each other (see §2 for more details). One exception to those is the Com-IC model by Lu et al. [29] , which studied the effect of complementary products propagating through a network. A significant omission from the literature on IM and viral marketing is a study where adoptions are grounded in a sound economic footing where users adopt itemsets in a rational manner so as to maximize their own utility.
Adoption of products or items by users is a well-studied concept in economics [19, 33, 38, 41] . Economists model item adoption by a user in terms of the utility that the user can derive from the item (or set of items). More precisely, a user's utility for an item (resp., itemset) is the difference between the valuation that the user has for the item (resp., itemset) and the price she needs to pay. There is a rich body of literature in combinatorial auctions (e.g., see [14, 16, 23, 26] ) which studies the optimal allocation of goods to users, given the users' valuation for various sets of goods. These studies do not take into consideration the network effect where users become aware of, and thus desire, various items as a result of their network peers adopting those items, in a recursive manner.
In this paper, we take the first step toward combining viral marketing (influence maximization) with a framework of item adoption grounded in the economic principle of item utility and propose a simple, elegant, yet powerful framework for capturing the interaction between these two paradigms. As a result of this seamless integration, we propose a novel optimization objective, i.e., social welfare, which is the sum of utilities of itemsets adopted by users at the end of a campaign, in expectation. While social welfare is well studied in combinatorial auctions, to our knowledge, it has not been studied in the context of viral marketing, taking into account the recursive network effect of items propagating via user adoptions and desires. We specifically focus on a setting where the items are mutually complementary. We achieve this by modeling user valuation for itemsets as a supermodular function (definition in §2). Supermodularity nicely captures the intuition that between complementary items, the marginal value-gain of an item w.r.t. a set of items increases as the set grows. Many companies offer complementary products, e.g., Apple offers iPhone X, Apple Watch, and AirPower, and Microsoft offers XBox console, XBox controller, and XBox games, etc. We study adoptions of complementary items, by combining a basic stochastic diffusion model for propagation with the utility model for item adoption. While our framework, results, and techniques carry over to any triggering model (see [24] ) we use the well-known IC model for ease of exposition.
In practice, prices of items may be known, however our knowledge of users' valuation for items may be uncertain. We explicitly introduce noise in our framework to model this uncertainty. We do not make any distributional assumptions about the noise, except for the standard assumption that it is zero mean. We study a novel objective of optimizing expected social welfare in our model. Specifically, we formulate the problem of finding the optimal allocation of items to seed nodes so as to maximize the expected social welfare. Expected social welfare naturally generalizes the expected spread and hence is readily shown to be NP-hard to optimize. Our resulting objective function of expected social welfare is monotone, but unlike most known studies in IM, it is neither submodular nor supermodular. We show that under the simple and reasonable assumption that price and noise are additive and valuation is supermodular, it is possible to efficiently find an allocation of items to seed users, that achieves an expected social welfare that is within a factor of (1 − 1/e − ) of the optimum. To our knowledge, this is the first result of this kind for a non-submodular (and non-supermodular) function for which such a high quality approximation is achieved.
While the main algorithm we propose for item allocation is a simple greedy algorithm, proving that it achieves the approximation guarantee above is far from simple and involves intricate reasoning about propagation of items, some combinations of which may have negative utility but may combine with other (complementary!) items to become positive. We develop a novel accounting method for reasoning about expected social welfare, which may be of independent interest.
A remarkable property of our allocation algorithm is that it does not require valuations or prices as input, i.e., it is agnostic to this information. In contrast, the existing adoption maximization algorithms for complementary products [29] need the adoption probabilities of an item given an already adopted itemset, as input.
Our algorithm and analysis demonstrate in a rigorous way the power of bundling -we should bundle complementary items together as much as possible to achieve high social welfare, irrespective of the actual valuations, prices, or noise distributions of items. We next illustrate our framework as well as the challenges. Example 1. Consider the network shown in Figure 1 , where all edge probabilities are assumed to be 1. Clearly nodes v 5 and v 1 are the two nodes with the highest expected spread, in order. There are three items {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 } propagating in the network. Assume no (i.e. zero) noise. Table 1 shows item subsets with non-negative utilities. All other item subsets have strictly negative utility, and hence not adopted by any node. Let the budget for i 1 , i 2 , i 3 be 2, 1, 1 respectively. Now a greedy allocation simply allocates all three items to node v 5 (the top node in terms of expected spread), and i 1 to v 1 . After the end of the propagation, nodes v 3 -v 7 adopt {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 }. Thus the expected social welfare, the sum of utilities of all nodes, obtained by greedy allocation is 5 × 3 = 15. Notice that the expected number of item adoptions is also 15. Now consider another allocation that allocates {i 1 , i 2 } to node v 1 and {i 1 , i 3 } to v 5 . In this case after the propagation ends, nodes v 1 , v 2 adopt {i 1 , i 2 }, v 3 , v 4 adopt {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 } and the remaining nodes adopt {i 1 , i 3 }. In terms of the number of adoptions, this allocation is superior to greedy: it results in a total of 16 adoptions among all items. However the social welfare produced is 11, which is inferior to that of greedy. We can extend the example so that the (expected) number of adoptions for greedy is much worse than the alternative allocation, while greedy allocation has superior social welfare. This shows an important aspect of our problem -optimizing the number of item adoptions is not aligned with optimizing social welfare, which makes the latter problem challenging.
A byproduct of our algorithmic solution is an adaptation of the state-of-the-art single-item influence maximization algorithm IMM [43] to satisfy the prefix-preserving property for multiple items with diverse budgets. That is, assuming every item i has budget b i , the algorithm outputs an ordered set S of b = max i b i seeds, such that with high probability, simultaneously for all items i, the prefix of S with b i nodes is a (1 − 1/e − )-approximate solution to the optimal solution with b i seeds, where > 0 is a small constant on the approximation accuracy. We are able to achieve the prefix-preserving property efficiently with the nearlinear expected running time in the same order as the IMM algorithm on the largest budget b, essentially independently of the number of items considered in the diffusion. This prefix-preserving algorithm could be of independent interest in its own right in multi-item IM.
Finally, we conduct extensive empirical evaluations of our algorithm together with a number of baselines, on both real and synthetic datasets. Our empirical results demonstrate that our algorithm significantly outperforms all baselines in terms of one or both of the quality of social welfare achieved and the running time.
To summarize, we make the following contributions.
• We incorporate utility-based item adoption with influence diffusion into a novel multi-item diffusion model, Economically Postulated IC (EPIC), and study a novel social welfare maximization problem for mutually complementary items ( §3).
• We propose a greedy allocation algorithm, and with a highly non-trivial analysis we show that the algorithm achieves (1 − 1/e − )-approximation ratio, despite the fact that the social welfare function is neither submodular nor supermodular under the EPIC model ( §4 and §5).
• Along the way, we design a prefix-preserving IM algorithm for multi-item influence maximization that may be of independent interest, with running time in the same order as the IMM algorithm on the maximum budgeted item, independent of the number of items in the diffusion ( §5).
• We conduct a detailed set of experiments comparing the performance of our algorithm with baselines on 4 large real networks, with both real and synthetic utility configurations. Our results show that our proposed algorithm significantly dominates the baselines in terms of running time or expected social welfare or both, and also provide insights on the effect of budget skew between items on the expected social welfare ( §6).
Background and related work is discussed in §2. In §7, we summarize the paper and discuss future work.
Background & Related Work
Single Item IM: A social network is represented as a directed graph G = (V, E, p) as described in §1. Two of the classic diffusion models are independent cascade (IC) and linear threshold (LT). We briefly review the IC model. Given a set S ⊂ V of seeds, diffusion proceeds in discrete time steps. At t = 0, only the seeds are active. At every time t > 0, each node u that became active at time t − 1 makes one attempt at activating each of its inactive out-neighbors v, i.e., it tests if the edge (u, v) is "live" or "blocked". The attempt succeeds (the edge (u, v) is live) with probability p uv := p(u, v). The diffusion stops when no more nodes become active.
We refer the reader to [8, 24] for details of these models and their generalizations. The influence spread of a seed set S, denoted σ(S), is the expected number of active nodes after the diffusion that starts from the seed set S ends.
Influence maximization (IM) is the problem of finding, for a given number k and a diffusion model, a set S ⊂ V of k seed nodes that generates the maximum influence spread σ(S) [24] .
Most existing studies on IM rely on the corresponding influence spread function σ(S) being monotone and submodular. A set function f :
; f is supermodular if the inequality above is reversed; and f is modular if it is both submodular and supermodular.
Under both the IC and LT models, the IM problem is NP-hard [24] and computing σ(S) exactly for any S ⊆ V is #P-hard [10, 12] . Since σ(·) is monotone and submodular for both IC and LT, a simple greedy seed selection algorithm together with Monte Carlo simulation for estimating the spread, achieves an (1 − 1/e − )-approximation, for any > 0 [23, 24, 35] . While several heuristics for IM were proposed over the years [10-12, 22, 25] , they do not offer any guarantee on the influence spread achieved. Borgs et al. [3] proposed the notion of random reverse reachable sets (rr-sets) for spread estimation as an alternative to using MC simulations and paved the way for efficient approximation algorithms for IM. Tang et al. [43, 44] leveraged rr-sets to propose scalable approximation algorithms for IM called TIM and IMM, which are orders of magnitude faster than the classic greedy algorithm making use of MC simulations for estimating the spread [24] . Building on the notion of rr-sets, a family of scalable approximation algorithms such as TIM, IMM, and SSA, have been developed for IM [20, 36, 43, 44] .
Motivated by designing an influence oracle, that responds to queries to find seeds for any given budget, Cohen et al. [13] proposed an IM algorithm called SKIM that leverages bottom-k sketches. A noteworthy property of SKIM is that it produces an ordering of the nodes such that any prefix of the ordering consisting of k nodes is guaranteed to have a spread that is at least (1 − 1/e − ) times the optimal spread for a seed budget of k. Thus, SKIM is essentially a prefix-preserving algorithm in context of single item IM. However, as shown in [13] , SKIM does not dominate TIM in performance. Given that IMM is orders of magnitude faster than TIM, there is a natural motivation to build a prefix-preserving IM algorithm by adapting IMM to a multi-item context.
Influence maximization under non-submodular models has been studied in previous work [9, 27, 29, 42] . Most of them show hardness of approximation results [9, 27, 42] . In terms of approximation algorithms, Chen et al. rely on a low-rank assumption to provide an algorithm solving the non-submodular amphibious influence maximization problem with an approximation ratio of (1 − 1/e − ) 3 [9] . Lu et al. use the sandwich approximation to give a problem instance dependent approximation ratio [29] . Schoenebeck and Tao provide a dynamic programming algorithm for influence maximization in the restricted one-way hierarchical blockmodel [42] . Li et al. provide an approximation algorithm with approximation ratio (1 − ) (1 − 1/e), in a network when at most nodes are -almost submodular and the rest of the nodes are submodular [27] . In contrast, our algorithm in this paper achieves the (1 − 1/e − ) approximation ratio (same as the ratio for submodular maximization) for a non-submodular objective function, under a general network without further assumptions. Multi-item IM: More recently, multiple items have been considered in the context of viral marketing of non-competing items [15, 34] . However their proposed solutions do not provide the typical (1 − 1/e − )approximation guarantee. Specifically Datta et al. [15] studied IM where propagations of items are assumed to be independent and provided a 1/3-approximate algorithm. In [34] , Narayanam et al. propose an extension of the LT model, where items are partitioned into two sets. A product can be adopted by a node only when it has already adopted a corresponding product in the other set. Such partition of itemsets, with strong dependencies on mutual adoptions of items in the two sets, represents a restricted special case of item adoptions in the real world.
Competitive influence maximization is studied in [2, 4-7, 18, 28, 40] (see [8] for a survey), where a user adopts at most one item from the set of items being propagated. The works mainly focus on the "follower's perspective" [2, 5, 6, 18] , i.e., given competitor's seed placement, select seeds so as to maximize one's own spread, or minimize the competitor's spread. Lu et al. [28] focused on maximizing the total influence spread of all campaigners from a network host perspective, while ensuring fair allocation.
Lu et al. [29] introduced a model called Com-IC capturing both competition and complementarity between a pair of items, leveraging the notion of a node level automaton (NLA). An NLA is a stochastic decisionmaking automaton governed by transition probabilities for a user adopting an item given what it has already adopted. Their model subsumes perfect complementarity and pure competition as special cases. However, their main study is confined to the diffusion of two items, and a straightforward extension to multiple items would need an exponential number of parameters in the number of items. Moreover, their general parameter settings could lead to anomalies such as one item complementing a second item but the second one competing with the first one, or being indifferent to it. All of the above works on multiple item propagations focus on maximizing the expected number of item adoptions, which is not aligned with social welfare (see Example 1).
Myers and Leskovec analyzed the effects of different cascades on users and predicted the likelihood that a user will adopt an item, seeing the cascades in which the user participated [32] . McAuley et al. [31] proposed a method to learn complementary relationships between products from user reviews. None of the works models the diffusion of complementary items, nor study the IM problem in this context. Combinatorial Auctions: Combinatorial auctions are widely studied and a survey is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we discuss a few key papers. In economics, adoption of items by users is modeled in terms of the utility that the user derives from the adoption [19, 33, 38, 41] . A classic problem is given m users and n items and the utility function of users for various subsets of items, find an allocation of items to users such that the social welfare, i.e., the sum of utilities of users resulting from the allocation, is maximized. This intractable problem has been studied in both offline and online settings [14, 16, 23, 26] and various approximation algorithms have been developed. All of them assume access to a value oracle or a demand oracle. A value oracle is a black box, which given a set of items as a query, returns the value of the itemset. A demand oracle is a black box, which given an assignment of prices to items, returns the itemset with maximum utility, i.e., value minus price. Also, the utility function in these settings is typically assumed to be sub-additive and as a result, this property extends to social welfare. Notably, these works do not consider the interaction of utility-maximizing item adoption with recursive propagation through a network. On the other hand, they consider more general settings where the utility functions are user-specific.
Inspired by the economics literature, we base item adoptions on item utility. Specifically, items have a price and a valuation and the difference is the utility. It is a well-accepted principle in economics and auction theory [14, 37] that users (agents), presented with a set of items, adopt a subset of items that maximizes their utility. It is this principle that we use in our framework to govern which users adopt what items.
The use of utility naturally leads to the notion of social welfare and we study the problem of assigning seed nodes to various items in order to maximize expected social welfare, in a setting where items are complementary. To our knowledge, in the context of viral marketing, we are the first to study the problem of maximizing (expected) social welfare.
In our experiments, we use both synthetic and real datasets. This calls for learning user utilities on the real datasets. We leverage Jiang et al.'s method [21] to learn the users' utilities. Specifically in [21] , from bidding histories, users' valuations of items are determined. We use it in conjunction with the price of items, to compute users' utilities. Users then make adoption decisions based on the utilities, whereas the propagation makes them aware of, and hence desire, the items.
EPIC Model
In this section, we describe a novel model called economically postulated independent cascade model (EPIC for short) that combines the diffusion dynamics of the classic IC model with an item adoption framework where decisions are governed by utility.
Utility based adoption
Utility is a widely studied concept in economics [16, 19, 33] and is commonly used to model item adoption decisions by users.
We next briefly review utility and provide the specific formulation we use in this paper. For general definitions related to utility, the reader is referred to [16, 38, 41] . We summarize the notations used in the paper in Table 6 in Appendix A.
We let I denote a finite universe of items. The utility of a set of items I ⊆ I for a user is the pay-off of I to the user and depends on aggregate effect of three components: the price P that the user needs to pay, the valuation V that the user has for I and a random noise term N , used to model the uncertainty in our knowledge of the user's valuation on items, where P, V and N are all set functions over items. For an item i ∈ I, P(i) > 0 denotes its price. We assume that price is additive, i.e., for an itemset I ⊆ I, P(I) = i∈I P(i). Although EPIC can handle any generic valuation function, in this paper we focus on complementary products. Hence we assume that V is supermodular : for two itemsets I 1 and I 2 such that
. We also assume V is monotone since it is a natural property for valuations. For i ∈ I, N (i) ∼ D(µ i = 0, ν 2 i ) denotes the noise term associated with item i, where the noise may be drawn from any distribution D having a zero mean. Every item has an independent noise distribution. For a set of items I ⊆ I, we assume the noise is additive, i.e., the noise of I, N (I) := i∈I N (i). Similar assumptions on additive noise are used in economics theory [19, 21] . Notice that all the three parameters -value, price and noise are user independent and depend only on items.
Finally, the utility of an itemset I is U(I) = V(I) − P(I) + N (I). Since noise is a random variable, utility is also random. However this randomness solely arises from the noise. Also because noise is drawn from a zero mean distribution, E[U(I)] = V(I) − P(I). For the empty itemset ∅, we assume V(I) = 0.
Diffusion Dynamics
Seed allocation. Let b = (b 1 , ..., b |I| ) be a vector of natural numbers representing the budgets associated with the items. An item's budget specifies the number of seed nodes that may be assigned to that item. We sometimes abuse notation and write b i ∈ b to indicate that b i is one of the item budgets. We denote the maximum budget as b := max{b i | b i ∈ b}. We define an allocation as a relation S ⊂ V × I such that ∀i ∈ I :
In words, each item is assigned a set of nodes whose size is under the item's budget. We refer to the nodes S S i := {v | (v, i) ∈ S} as the seed nodes of S for item i and to the nodes S S := i∈I S S i as the seed nodes of S. We denote the set of items allocated to a node v ∈ V as
Desire and adoption. Every node maintains two sets of items called desire set and adoption set. Desire set is the set of items that the node has been informed about (and thus potentially desires), via propagation or seeding. Adoption set, is the subset of the desire set, that the node adopts. At any time a node selects, from its desire set at that time, the subset of items that maximizes the utility and adopts it. W.l.o.g., we assume that ties between itemsets, if any, are broken in favor of larger itemsets. Following previous literature, we consider a progressive model: once a node desires an item, it remains in the node's desire set forever; similarly, once an item is adopted by a node, it cannot be unadopted later. For a node u, R S (u, t) denotes its desire set and A S (u, t) denotes its adoption set at the time t, pertinent to an allocation S. We omit the time argument t to refer to the adoption (desire) set at the end of diffusion. E.g., A S (u) denotes the final adoption set of node u at the end of diffusion for node u. We are now ready to present the diffusion process of EPIC. Diffusion model. In the beginning of any diffusion, the noise terms of all items are sampled, which are then used till the diffusion terminates. The diffusion then proceeds in discrete time steps, starting from t = 1. Given an allocation S at t = 1, the seed nodes have their desire sets initialized : ∀v ∈ S S , R S (v, 1) = I S v . Seed nodes then adopt the subset of items from the desire set that maximizes the utility, breaking ties, if any, in favor of sets of larger cardinality. As a result, a seed node may not adopt all items allocated to it.
Once a seed node u adopts an item i, its neighbor u is influenced with probability p u,u (as in the IC model). If the influence succeeds then i is added to the desire set of u at time t = 2. The rest of the diffusion process is described in Fig.2. 1. Edge transition. At every time step t > 1, for a node u that has adopted at least one new item at t − 1, its outgoing edges are tested for transition. For an untested edge (u , u), flip a biased coin independently: (u , u) is live w.p. p u ,u and blocked w.p. 1 − p u ,u . Each edge is tested at most once in the entire diffusion process and its status is remembered for the duration of a diffusion process. Then for each node u that has at least one in-neighbor u (with a live edge (u , u)) which adopted at least one item at t − 1, u is tested for possible item adoption (2-3 below).
Generating desire Set
The desire set of node u at time t,
is live} denotes the set of in-neighbors of u having a live edge connecting to u.
3. Node adoption. Node u determines the utilities for all subsets of items of the desire set R S (u, t). u then adopts a set 
Definition of Social welfare Maximization
Let G = (V, E, p) be a social network, I the universe of items under consideration. In this paper, we consider a novel utility-based objective called social welfare, which is the sum of all users' utilities of itemsets adopted by them after propagation converges. Formally, E(U(A S (u))) is the expected utility that a user u enjoys for a seed allocation S after the propagation ends. Then the expected social welfare (known as "consumer surplus" in other communities such as algorithmic game theory) for S, is ρ(
Notice that the expectation is over both the randomness of propagation and the randomness due to noise. We define the problem of maximizing expected social welfare (WelMax ) as follows. We refer to V, P, N , as the model parameters and denote them collectively as Param.
, the set of model parameters Param, and budget vector b, find a seed allocation S * , such that ∀i ∈ I, |S * i | ≤ b i and S * maximizes the expected social welfare, i.e., S * = arg max S ρ(S).
Proof (Sketch). It is easy to check that the classical influence maximization in the IC model, an NP hard problem, is a special case of WelMax.
Function types. Notice that the functions V and U are functions over sets of items, whereas σ is a function over sets of network nodes, and ρ is a function over allocations, which are sets of (node, item) pairs. When we speak of a certain property (e.g., monotonicity, submodularity, etc.) of a function of a given type, the property is meant w.r.t. the applicable type. E.g., σ is well-known to be monotone and submodular w.r.t. sets of nodes. Similarly, we assume that V is a monotone supermodular function over sets of items.
Properties of EPIC
Since WelMax is NP-hard, we turn our attention to an analysis of standard properties such as monotonicity and submodularity of the welfare function that can help us design efficient approximation strategies. We first develop an equivalent possible world model that will help in our analysis.
Possible world model
Given an instance I = G, Param of EPIC, where G = (V, E, p), we define a possible world associated with the instance I as a pair W = (W E , W N ), where W E is an edge possible world (edge world), which is a sample graph drawn from the distribution associated with G by sampling edges, and W N is a noise possible world (noise world), which is a sample of noise terms for each item in I, drawn from the corresponding item's noise distribution in Param. As all the random terms are sampled, propagation and adoption in W is fully deterministic. For nodes u, v ∈ V , we say v is reachable from u in W if there is a directed path from u to v in the deterministic graph W E . U W (I) denotes the (deterministic) utility of itemset I in W . For a node u and an allocation S, we denote its desire and adoption sets at time t in world W as R S W (u, t) and A S W (u, t) respectively. When only the noise terms are sampled, i.e., in a noise world W N , the utilities are deterministic, but the propagation remains random.
Given a possible world W = (W E , W N ) and an allocation S, a node v ∈ V adopts a set of items as follows: (i) if v is a seed node, then it desires I S v at time t = 1 and adopts an itemset
with the same maximum utility, we assume that v breaks ties in favor of the set with the larger cardinality.
We start with a basic result on utility. U W N denotes the utility function in a noise world W N . The following result is immediate since V is supermodular while P and N are modular. Lemma 1. In any given noise world W N , U W N is supermodular with respect to sets of items.
It follows that the expectation of utility w.r.t. edge worlds is supermodular. It is easy to show that U W N is not monotone, because adding an item with a very high price may decrease the utility. We next establish a basic property of EPIC: in any possible world, given a set of items that a node desires, there is a unique set of items it will adopt. Specifically, if there are multiple sets tied for utility, the node will adopt their union. For a set function f :
We say that an itemset A is a local maximum w.r.t. the utility function U W , if the utility of A is the maximum among all its subsets, i.e.,
Lemma 2. Let W be a possible world and A, B ⊆ I be any itemsets such that A and B are local maxima with respect to U W . Then (A ∪ B) is also a local maximum with respect to U W , i.e.,
Under a possible world W , for any allocation S, any node u's adoption set at any time t,
Notice that the adoption logic of a node at time t requires that its adoption set at time t should include its adoption set at time t − 1, so it is not obvious that A S W (u, t) is a local maximum. The above lemma is proved by an induction on time t (Appendix A.1).
Consider the desire set R S W (v, t). By definition, at time t = 1, v should adopt the subset of items in R S W (v, 1) that has the maximum utility. When t > 1, v adopts the subset of its desire set at time t that (a) includes A S W (v, t − 1) and (b) has maximum utility subject to (a). What if there are subsets A, B with the same maximum utility? In this case, both A and B are local maxima w.r.t. U W by Lemma 3, and by Lemma 2, A∪B is also a local maximum w.r.t. U W . It follows that U W (A∪B) ≥ U W (A) = U W (B). Thus, the semantics of adoption is well defined: from its desire set, a node chooses the subset, including the previously adopted itemset, that has maximum utility and breaks ties, if any, by choosing the subset with the maximum cardinality.
Our next result shows that in any given possible world, adoption of items propagates through reachability. This is a key property in establishing the correctness of our algorithm.
Lemma 4. For any item i and any world W , if a node u adopts i under allocation S, then all nodes that are reachable from u in the world W also adopt i.
The social welfare of an allocation S in a possible world W = (W E , W N ) is defined as the sum of utilities of itemsets adopted by nodes, i.e., ρ W (S) :
Their expectations are defined in the obvious manner. Specifically, the expected social welfare of an allocation S is ρ(
The expected adoption count of S is defined similarly. It is straightforward to show that the expected social welfare of allocation S defined in §3.3 is equivalent to the above definition. We now proceed to investigate the properties of social welfare.
Properties of social welfare
The following result shows that the social welfare function is monotone. The key intuition is that in each possible world, the social welfare is monotone, a result proved by induction on the propagation time.
Theorem 1. Expected social welfare is monotone with respect to the sets of node-item allocation pairs.
Since we are treating seed allocation S as node-item pairs, we can examine the submodularity of expected social welfare with respect to such sets of pairs. Specifically, the expected social welfare is submodular, if for allocations S ⊆ S and an allocation pair
. Supermodularity is defined by reversing the inequality.
Theorem 2. Expected social welfare is neither submodular nor supermodular with respect to the sets of node-item allocation pairs.
The detailed counterexamples can be found in Appendix A.1. The intuition is that, in the EPIC model, the node level adoption exhibits supermodularity because the utility function is supermodular (Lemma 1), but the propagation behavior is governed by reachability (Lemma 4), and thus exhibits submodularity. Therefore, the combined propagation and adoption behavior in EPIC exhibits a complicated behavior that is neither submodular nor supermodular. In the next section, we will show that surprisingly, despite such complicated behavior, we can still design a greedy algorithm that achieves a (1 − 1/e − )-approximation to the optimal expected social welfare.
Approximation Algorithm

Overview and Greedy Allocation
Given that the welfare function is neither submodular nor supermodular, designing an approximation algorithm for WelMax is challenging. Nevertheless, in this section we show that for given and , a (1 − 1 e − )approximation to the optimal social welfare can be achieved with probability at least 1 − 1 |V | , using a simple greedy algorithm. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first instance in the context of viral marketing, where we are able to guarantee an efficient approximation for a non-submodular objective at the same level as has been done in the literature for submodular objectives. We first present our algorithm and then proceed to analyzing its correctness and efficiency.
Our algorithm, called greedyWM (for Greedy Welfare Maximization) and shown in Algorithm 1, is based on a greedy allocation of seed nodes to items. Given a graph G, the universe of items I, item budget vector b, , and , greedyWM first selects (line 2) the top-b seed nodes S Grd := S b for the IC model (disregarding item utilities), where b = max{b i | b i ∈ b}. Then, (line 4) for each item i with budget b i , it assigns the top-b i nodes from S Grd to i. We will show that this allocation achieves a (1 − 1 e − )-approximation to the optimal expected social welfare. For this to work, the seed selection algorithm must ensure that the b seeds selected, S b , satisfy a prefix-preserving property. That is, intuitively for every budget b i ∈ b, the top-b i seeds among S Grd must provide a (1 − 1 e − )-approximation to the optimal expected spread under budget b i . This property is ensured by invoking the PRIMM algorithm (Algorithm 3) in line 2 of Algorithm 1. Algorithm 3 is described and its correctness and running time complexity are established in §5.3. Then greedyWM allocates the top-b i nodes in S Grd as seeds for each item i ∈ I. Here is a preview of the main result of this section.
Theorem 3. Let S Grd be the greedy allocation generated by greedyWM, and S OPT be the optimal allocation. Given > 0 and > 0, with probability at least 1 − 1 |V | , we have
The running time of greedyWM is O((b + + log n | b|)(m + n) log n/ 2 ).
Our algorithm greedyWM has the interesting property that it does not need the valuation functions, prices, and the distributions of noises as input, and thus works for all possible utility settings. It reflects the power of bundling, and is in contrast with the algorithmic solution in [29] for the complementary setting.
The analysis of the algorithm is highly non-trivial, because it needs to consider all possible seed allocations, propagation scenarios, with budgets possibly being non-uniform among items. Our main idea is a "block" based accounting method: we break the set of items into "atomic" blocks, in the sense that each block has non-negative marginal utility given previous blocks, so that it can propagate as an atomic unit in the diffusion process. Then we account for each block's contribution to the social welfare during a propagation, and argue that for every block, the contribution of the block achieved by the greedy allocation is always at least (1 − 1/e − ) times the contribution under any allocation. The technical subtlety of the analysis includes properly defining the blocks, showing why each block can be accounted for separately, dealing with partial item propagation within blocks, etc.
We now formalize the prefix-preserving property mentioned above. Recall that this property requires that every prefix of size b i of S Grd should be an approximately optimal solution to IM under budget b i , where b i ∈ b. One way of trivially satisfying this property is to find the exact greedy solution. However, exact computation of expected spread (and hence marginal gain) is intractable [10, 12] . Known scalable approximation algorithms for IM such as TIM [44] , IMM [43] , SSA [36] only provide an approximately optimal solution with a certain (high) probability. If such an algorithm is directly used to find S b = S Grd , there is no guarantee that the top-b i seeds in S Grd will be approximately optimal for IM under budget b i , ∀b i ∈ b. We formalize the prefix-preserving property next.
S Grd bi denotes the top-b i nodes chosen by the greedy algorithm for IM and OPT bi denotes the optimal expected spread of b i nodes (under the IC model).
Definition 1. (Prefix-Preserving Property). Given G = (V, E, p) and any budget vector b, we say that an influence maximization algorithm A is prefix-preserving w.r.t. b, if for any > 0 and > 0, it returns an ordered set S Grd b of size b, such that with probability at least
Unfortunately, state-of-the-art IM algorithms [20, 36, 43] are not prefix-preserving out-of-the-box. We present a non-trivial extension of IMM [43] , called PRIMM (PRefix IMM), to make it prefix-preserving. We defer the presentation of PRIMM to §5.3.
Block Accounting
Recall the possible world model introduced in Section 4.1: in a possible world W = (W E , W N ), W N denotes a noise world where only the noise terms are sampled, and W E denotes an edge world where edges are sampled, and W = (W E , W N ) denotes a deterministic world where both noise terms and edges are sampled.
Assign the first b i nodes of the ranked set S Grd , to item i, i.e., S Grd
In the rest of the analysis, we fix the noise world W N , and prove that
where ρ W N denotes the expected social welfare under the fixed noise world W N . We could then simply take another expectation over the distribution of W N to obtain Inequality (1) in our main theorem. Let U W N be the utility function under the noise possible world W N .
Given W N , let I * W N ⊆ I be the subset of items that gives the largest utility in W N , with ties broken in favor of sets with larger cardinality. By Lemma 2, I * W N must be unique. This implies that the marginal utility of any subset of I \ I * W N given I * W N is strictly negative. By the supermodularity of the utility function U W N in the fixed noise world W N (Lemma 1), it further follows that the marginal utility of any subset of I \ I * W N given any subset of I * W N is strictly negative, which means no items in I \ I * W N can ever be adopted by any user under the noise world W N . Thus, once we fix W N , we can safely remove all items in I \ I * W N from consideration. For simplicity, in the rest of §5.2, we use I * as a shorthand for I * W N since the noise possible world W N is fixed. 5.2.1 Block generation process. We now discuss the block based accounting method for analyzing the social welfare. We divide items in I * into a sequence of disjoint blocks such that each block has a non-negative marginal utility w.r.t. the union of all its preceding blocks. We next discuss how the blocks are generated.
Let
We order the items in non-increasing order of their budgets, i.e., assume that b 1 ≥ b 2 ≥ · · · ≥ b |I * | , with ties on budgets broken in an arbitrary but fixed manner. As discussed above, I * has the largest utility among all subsets of I under the fixed noise world W N . Algorithm 2 shows the pseudocode to generate the blocks from I * for a given W N . Note that this block generation process is solely used for our accounting analysis and is not part of our seed allocation algorithm.
We first generate a global sequence I of all non-empty subsets of I * , following a specific enumeration order, defined as follows. For any two distinct subsets S, S ⊆ I * , we use the following precedence order ≺ to place them in the sequence I.
• Arrange each of the sets S, S in decreasing order of item indices. Compare items in S, S , starting from the highest indexed items of S and S . If they match then compare the second highest indexed items and so on until one of the following happens:
1. One of the sets S or S exhausts. If say S exhausts first, then S ≺ S .
2. The current pair of items in S and S do not match. Then S ≺ S , if the current item of S has a lower index than the current item of S .
Example 2 (Itemset sequencing). Suppose we have three items It is straightforward to see that this defines a total order on subsets of I * and thus the sequence I is well defined. Then, we scan through this sequence, with the purpose of generating a sequence B of disjoint blocks. For each subset B being scanned, if its marginal utility given all previously selected blocks is non-negative, i.e., U W N (B | B) ≥ 0, where B is the currently selected sequence of blocks, and B is the union of all items in these selected blocks, then we append B to the end of selected sequence B, i.e., B = B ⊕ B, where ⊕ denotes "append". After selecting B, we remove all subsets in I that overlap with B, and restart the scan 
Then as per the block generation process {i 1 , i 3 } will be chosen as first block B 1 . Notice that, {i 1 , i 3 } and {i 2 , i 3 } both have non-negative marginal utility w.r.t. ∅. However since in I, {i 1 , i 3 } is ordered ahead of {i 2 , i 3 }, it gets to be picked as B 1 . Once B 1 is chosen all itemsets containing i 1 or i 3 are deleted from I, Let B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B t be the sequence of blocks generated, where t is the number of blocks in the block partition. These blocks satisfy the following properties.
The disjointness of blocks is clear from the construction. The fact that every item in I * belongs to some block stems from the fact that I * has the maximum utility under W N , because if I * \ ∪ i∈[t] B i is not empty, then this subset must have non-negative marginal utility given ∪ i∈[t] B i , so by the construction it will be appended to the block sequence. We define the marginal gain of each block B i as
For any subset S in the sequence I, for any T that is a proper subset of S, T appears before S in I.
Let A ⊆ I * be an arbitrary subset of items. We partition A using the blocks. Specifically define
then it is an empty block, otherwise, we call it a partial block. Define
Using the above equation, we devise our accounting method such that each A i is accounted for using ∆ A i in its social welfare contribution. The following lemma summarizes some important properties related to (partial) blocks.
Social welfare under greedy allocation.
We are now ready to analyze the social welfare of our greedy allocation (Algorithm 1) using block accounting. The following lemma states an important result related to the seed nodes.
Lemma 6. In the greedy allocation, if A i is the first partial block assigned to a seed node v ∈ S Grd , then at time step 1 when propagation through edges has not yet started, v can only adopt the set of full blocks
for any possible world W that is consistent with W N . The above lemma shows that for each seed node v, once some block B i is not fully assigned to v, then v will not adopt all subsequent items. For a block B i , we define its proposed budget b i to be the minimum budget among its items, i.e., b i = min j∈Bi b j . Under the greedy allocation, the proposed budget of B i is the same as the maximum number of seed nodes to which the full block B i is offered. However, some seed nodes may not adopt the block. From Lemma 6 we know that a full block B i is not adopted by a seed node v even after v is assigned to B i , if and only if at least one of the blocks from B 1 , ..., B i−1 is not assigned to v. This could happen when some blocks in B 1 , ..., B i−1 actually appear after B i in the sequence I, so that they have a smaller budget than the proposed budget of B i , namely b i . For that, we further define the effective budget of a block B i , b i , to be the minimum proposed budget among all blocks B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B i , i.e., b i = min j∈B1∪...∪Bi b i . Under the greedy allocation, the effective budget of B i corresponds to the number of seed nodes that actually adopt the full block B i after the seed assignment and without considering the effect of propagation. We use the notation S Grd Bi to denote all the seed nodes that are assigned the full block B i ; and S GrdE Bi to denote all the seed nodes that actually adopt B i at step 1 without considering propagation under the greedy allocation, and we call S GrdE Bi the effective greedy seeds of B i .
Example 4 (Block budgets). Revisit the blocks shown in Example 3. If we assume that
We remark that the definitions of proposed budget and effective budget of a block is purely based on the block sequence B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B t , and they are also the key concepts to be used in the analysis of the social welfare of arbitrary allocations in the next section. With these definitions, we are ready to state and prove the following lemma for the social welfare of greedy allocation. Lemma 7. Let S Grd be the greedy allocation obtained using Algorithm 1. Then the expected social welfare
Bi are the effective seed nodes of block B i in allocation S Grd , σ(·) is the expected spread function under the IC model, and ∆ i is as defined in Eq. (2).
The above lemma provides the exact accounting for the expected social welfare under the greedy allocation, and it will be used to compare against an arbitrary seed allocation below. 5.2.3 Social welfare under an arbitrary allocation. We first categorize blocks into two types namely over budgeted and properly budgeted, based on their proposed and effective budgets. A block B i is an over budgeted block, if its effective budget is strictly less than its proposed budget, i.e., b i < b i . Otherwise, b i = b i , and the block is said to be properly budgeted.
For every block we define its corresponding anchor block and anchor item. Anchor block B a i , of an over budgeted block B i is the block from B 1 , ..., B i−1 that has the minimum proposed budget. In case of a tie, the block having highest index is chosen as the anchor block. Anchor item a i , for an over budgeted block B i , is the highest indexed item in its corresponding anchor block B a i . On the other hand, for a properly budgeted block, the block itself is its own anchor block. The anchor item is the highest indexed item of the block. Notice that, by definition, if block B j is the anchor block of block B i with j < i, then block B j is also the anchor block for all blocks B j , B j+1 , . . . , B i . In particular, B j itself must be a properly budgeted block. Moreover, the effective budget of block B i is the proposed budget of its anchor block. Example 5 (Anchor block and item). Block B 2 in Example 4 is an over budgeted block and its anchor block is B a 2 = B 1 . Its corresponding anchor item a 2 is the highest indexed item of block B a 2 , i.e., i 3 . Since B 1 is a properly budgeted block, its anchor block is the block itself and consequently anchor item a 1 is again i 3 . Lemma 8. Let B i be an over budgeted block, B j (j < i) be the anchor block of B i , and a i be the anchor item of B i in B j . During the diffusion process from the seed allocation S, let A be the set of items in B j ∪ . . . ∪ B i that have been adopted by v by time t. If v has not yet adopted the anchor item a i by time t and A = ∅, then U W N (A | B 1 . . . , B j−1 ) < 0.
From the above lemma, we notice that for an over budgeted block B i , as long as its anchor item a i is not adopted yet, B i together with other adopted items in B j , . . . , B i−1 only contributes negative marginal social welfare. Therefore, we could ignore their propagation and marginal contribution in our accounting method. However, we cannot ignore block B i in the propagation when it co-occurs with its anchored block a i . The following lemma is based on the above idea. Lemma 9. For any arbitrary seed allocation S, the expected social welfare in W N is ρ W N (S) ≤ i∈[t] σ(S ai )· ∆ i , where S ai is the seed set assigned to the anchor item a i of block B i , and ∆ i is as defined in Eq. (2).
The combination of Lemma 7 and Lemma 9 leads to the approximation guarantee of greedyWM (Eq. (1) of Theorem 3).
Item-wise prefix preserving IMM
The classical models of influence propagation assume a single item and IMM [43] is one of the state of the art algorithms for influence maximization. For a single item, as well as for multiple items with uniform budgets, the prefix property is trivial. In the presence of multiple items with non-uniform budgets, an algorithm that returns a seed set of high quality with only a probabilistic guarantee need not satisfy the prefix preserving property (Definition 1). In this section, we present PRIMM (PRefix IMM), shown in Algorithm 3, which is a prefix-preserving extension of IMM for multiple items. Notice that NodeSelection(R, k) is the standard greedy algorithm for finding a seed set of size k by solving max k-cover on the set of RR sets R. For more details, the reader is referred to [43] .
PRIMM ingests four inputs, namely the budget vector b, graph G, and , with b sorted in non-increasing order as stated in Definition 1. Given , for a budget k, IMM generates a set of RR sets R, such that |R| ≥ λ * k /OPT k with probability at least 1 − 1/n . PRIMM derives a number > as a function of (Algorithm 3, line 3), the details of which we provide in Appendix A.3. Before that, we briefly describe PRIMM. Extending the bounding technique of [43] , for each budget k, we set
where, α = √ log n + log 2 is a constant independent of k, and β k = (1 − 1/e) · (log n k + log n + log 2). Note that we use log without a base to represent the natural logarithm.
The basic idea of PRIMM is to generate enough RR sets such that for any budget k ∈ b, |R| ≥ λ * k /OPT k , with probability at least 1 − 1/n . Since OPT k is unknown, we rely on a good lower bound of OPT k , i.e., LB k , as proposed in IMM [43] . Specifically PRIMM starts from the highest budget, i.e., b 1 . For a given budget k ∈ b and i it samples enough RR sets into R first (lines 8-9) and then checks the coverage condition on the sampled set of RR sets (line 14). Note if R already had enough number of RR sets (generated at a previous budget), then it skips RR set generation and moves directly to coverage check. If the coverage condition succeeds, then a good LB for the budget k is determined. It uses the LB to find the required number of RR sets (lines 16-18) for k and moves to the next budget. It then reuses the prefix of the ordered seed set found for budget k as the seed set found for the new budget, avoiding a redundant call to the NodeSelection procedure. This is fine because NodeSelection is a deterministic greedy procedure in finding seed nodes, and the last call to NodeSelection before the budget switch, is using the same RR set collection R with a larger budget, and thus it already found all the seed nodes for the new budget. If the coverage condition fails, it increments i to sample more RR sets for the current budget k (line 21).
If for any budget, all possible i values are tested, PRIMM breaks the for-loop and generates RR sets (for that budget) using LB = 1 (line 23), which is the lowest possible value of LB. Further, since budgets are 4) ), there cannot be any remaining budget k , where k ≤ k, for which λ * k /LB (line 23) is higher. Hence the RR set generation process terminates. Finally PRIMM returns the top-b seeds by invoking node selection with budget b on the final generated set of RR sets, R (line 26).
The correctness and the running time of the PRIMM algorithm mainly follows the proof of the IMM algorithm in [43] , and is given in Appendix A.3. Finally, our main theorem, Theorem 3, follows from the correctness of Algorithm greedyWM and PRIMM. 6 Experiments
Experiment Setup
We perform extensive experiments on four real social networks. We first experiment with synthetic utility (value and price) functions. To experiment with real utility functions, we learn the values and noise distributions of items from the bidding data of eBay; and obtain item prices from Craigslist and Facebook groups. All experiments are performed on a Linux machine with Intel Xeon 2.6 GHz CPU and 128 GB RAM. 6.1.1 Networks. Table 2 summarizes the networks and their characteristics. Flixster is mined in [29] from a social movie site and a strongly connected component is extracted. Douban is a Chinese social network [45] , where users rate books, movies, music, etc. In [29] all movie and book ratings of the users in the graph are crawled separately to derive two datasets from book and movie ratings: Douban-Book and Douban-Movie. Twitter is one of the largest network datasets, which is publicly available at [1]. 6.1.2 Algorithms compared. We compare greedyWM against four baselines -RR-SIM + , RR-CIM, item-disj and bundle-disj. RR-SIM + and RR-CIM, proposed in [29] , are two state-of-the art algorithms designed for complementary products in the context of IM. However, they work only with two items. Extending the Com-IC framework and the RR-SIM + and RR-CIM algorithms for more than two items is highly non-trivial as that requires dealing with a NLA with exponentially many states. Hence in comparing the performance of greedyWM against RR-SIM + and RR-CIM, we limit the number of items to two. Later we experiment with more than two items. Below, by deterministic utility of an itemset I, we mean V(I) − P(I), i.e., its utility with the noise term ignored. 6.1.2.1 Com-IC baselines. For two items i 1 and i 2 , given seed set of item i 2 (resp. i 1 ), RR-SIM + (resp. RR-CIM) finds seed set of item i 1 (resp. i 2 ) such that expected number of adoptions of i 1 is maximized. Initial seeds of i 2 (resp. i 1 ) is chosen using IMM [43] .
6.1.2.2 Item-disjoint. Our next baseline is item-disj, which allocates only one item to every seed node. Given the set of items I, item-disj finds i∈I b i nodes, say L, using IMM [43] , where b i is the budget of item i. Then it visits items in L in non-increasing order of budgets, assigns item i to first b i nodes and removes those b i nodes from L. By explicitly assigning every item to different seeds, item-disj does not leverage the effect of supermodularity. However it benefits from the network effect: since the utilities are supermodular, if more neighbors of a node adopt some item, it is more likely that the node will also adopt an item. Thus, when individual items have positive utility and hence can be adopted and propagate on their own, by choosing more seeds, item-disj makes use of the network effect to encourage more adoptions. Following previous work [20, 36, 43, 44] we set the probability of edge e = (u, v) to 1/d in (v). Unless otherwise specified, we use = 0.5 and = 1 as our default values for all five methods as recommended in [29, 43] . The Com-IC algorithms RR-SIM + and RR-CIM use GAP parameters (adoption probabilities) to model the interaction between items. We explain how the corresponding GAP parameters can be simulated within the EPIC framework using utilities, which we use in our comparison. Let i 1 and i 2 be the two items. Suppose the desire set of a node u only has item i 1 . The condition that u adopts i 1 is V(i 1 ) − P(i 1 ) + N (i 1 ) ≥ 0. Thus the GAP parameter q i1|∅ is given by:
Now suppose i 1 has been adopted by u, and i 2 enters the desire set. The GAP parameter q i2|i1 is the probability of adopting i 2 given that i 1 has been adopted. So we have
Since noise N (i 2 ) is independent of noise N (i 1 ), we can remove the above condition in the conditional probability, and obtain
The other two GAP parameters, q i2|∅ and q i1|i2 can be obtained similarly. To summarize, we have To enable comparison with the Com-IC algorithms RR-SIM + and RR-CIM, in our first set of experiments, we limit number of items to two. We explore six different configurations corresponding to the choice of the values, prices, noise distribution parameters, and item budgets (see Table 3 ). While EPIC does not assume any specific distribution for noise, in our experiments we use a gaussian distribution for illustration.
Experiments on two items
Configurations 1 and 2 signify a utility setting where the individual items i 1 and i 2 have negative deterministic utility, while {i 1 , i 2 } has a non-negative utility. Notice under this setting, greedyWM and bundle-disj are equivalent, because the only possible bundle is {i 1 , i 2 }. In Configurations 3 and 4, individual items have non-negative deterministic utility. In this setting item-disj and bundle-disj are equivalent. Finally, in Configurations 5 and 6 one item has a negative deterministic utility while the other item has a non-negative one. In this setting, again greedyWM and bundle-disj are equivalent.
For every parameter setting, we consider two budget settings, namely uniform (e.g., Configuration 1) and non-uniform (resp. Configuration 2). In case of uniform budget, both items have same the same budget k, where k is varied from 10 to 50 in steps of 10. For non-uniform budget, i 1 's budget is fixed at 70, and i 2 's budget is varied from 30 to 110 in steps of 20. Additive Uniform 8
Cone-max Non-uniform 9
Cone-min Non-uniform 10
Level-wise Uniform Table 4 : Multiple item configurations.
Social
Welfare. We compare the social welfare achieved by all algorithms on all six configurations. However, in Fig. 3 , we show the results only for Douban-Movie network on Configurations 2, 3, 5 and 6. The trend of the results is similar on other networks and configurations, hence they are omitted. In terms of social welfare, greedyWM outperforms all the baselines consistently. The social welfare produced by item-disj and bundle-disj depends on the specific configurations. E.g., when individual items have negative deterministic utility (Configuration 2), item-disj produces 0 expected social welfare as expected ( Fig. 3(a) ). Even when the welfare is non-zero for item-disj greedyWM achieves an expected social welfare which is upto 5 times higher ( Fig. 3(d) ). A similar remark applies when bundle-disj and greedyWM are not equivalent (e.g., Fig. 3(b) ). Further, notice that RR-SIM + and RR-CIM produce welfare similar to greedyWM. It follows from Table 4 of [30] that under this configuration, RR-SIM + and RR-CIM end up copying the seeds of other item. Hence their allocations are similar to greedyWM. However, as shown next, greedyWM runs much faster than the other two and unlike them, easily supports more than two items, which makes greedyWM more usable in practice for multiple items over large networks. 6.2.2 Running time. We study the running time of all algorithms using Configuration 1. The results are shown in Fig. 4 . As can be seen, greedyWM and bundle-disj are equivalent and hence have the same running time. However, greedyWM significantly outperforms all other baselines on every dataset. RR-SIM + and RR-CIM are particularly slow. In fact, on the large T witter network, they could not finish even after 6 hours. We had to time them out, hence they are omitted from Fig. 4(d) . In comparison with the baselines, greedyWM is upto 5 orders of magnitude faster than RR-CIM and upto 1.5 times than item-disj. Running times on other configurations show a similar trend, and are omitted.
6.3 More than two items 6.3.1 The configurations. Having established the superiority of greedyWM for two items, we now consider more than two items. Recall that RR-SIM + and RR-CIM cannot work with more than two items, so we confine our baselines to item-disj and bundle-disj. We gauge the performance of the algorithms on social welfare and running time. We also study the effect of budget distribution on social welfare. We design four configurations corresponding to the choice of budget and utility (see Table 4 ). For all configurations, we sample noise terms from N (0, 1). Price and value are set in such a way as to achieve certain shapes for the set of itemsets in the lattice that have a positive utility (see below). 6.3.1.1 Configurations 7-9. Configuration 7 is the simplest one for multiple items: every item has the same budget; price and value are set such that every item has the same utility of 1 and utility is additive. Thus, by design, this configuration gives minimal advantage to any algorithm that tries to leverage supermodularity. The next two configurations (8 and 9) model the situation where a single "core" item is necessary in order to make an itemset's utility positive. E.g., a smartphone may be a core item, without which its accessories do not have a positive utility. We set the core item's utility to 5. The addition of any other item increases the utility by 2. Thus, all supersets of the core item have a positive utility, while all other subsets have a negative utility. Thus, the set of subsets with positive utility forms a "cone" in the itemset lattice. In Configuration 8 (resp. 9), the core item is the item with maximum (resp. minimum) budget. Finally, we design a more general configuration where the set of itemsets with positive utility forms an arbitrary shape. Specifically we design Configuration 10 as follows.
6.3.1.2 Configuration 10. We consider the itemset lattice, with level t having subsets of size t. We randomly set the prices and values of items in level 1 such that a random subset of items have a non-negative utility. Let A t be any itemset at level t > 1 and i ∈ A t any item. We choose a value uniformly at random, ∼ U [1, 5] , and set
where P(A, q) denotes the set of subsets of A of size q. That is, the marginal gain of an item i w.r.t. A t \ {i} is set to be the maximum marginal gain of i w.r.t. subsets of A t of size t − 2, plus a randomly chosen boost ( ). E.g., let A 4 = {i, j, k, l}, t = 4 then, V(i|{j, k, l}) = max{V(i|{j, k}), V(i|{k, l}), V(i|{j, l})} + .
Recall that the value computation proceeds level-wise starting from level t = 0. Thus, for any itemset A t in Eq. (6), V(i|B) for subsets B is already defined.
Finally, we set V(
We can show that this way of assigning values ensures that the value function is well-defined and supermodular in Appendix A.4. 6.3.2 Social welfare. First, we study the social welfare achieved by the algorithms, in each of the the above configurations, with the total budget varied from 500 to 1000 in steps of 100. For Configurations 7 and 10, we set the budget uniformly for every item. For other configurations, the max budget is set to 20% of the total budget, min budget to 2%, and the remaining budget is split uniformly. The results are shown in Fig. 5 . Under Configurations 8 and 9, greedyWM and bundle-disj produces the same allocation, hence the welfare is the same. However in general greedyWM outperforms every baseline in all the four configurations by producing welfare upto 4 times higher than baselines. 6.3.3 Running time vs number of items. Next, we study the effect of the number of items on the running time of the algorithms. For this experiment, we use Configuration 7. We set the budget of every item to k = 50 and vary the number of items s, from 1 to 10. Fig. 6 shows the running times on the T witter dataset. As the number of items increases the number of seed nodes to be selected for item-disj and bundle-disj increases. Notice both item-disj and bundle-disj select the same number of seeds, which is k × s. item-disj selects it by one invocation of IMM, with budget ks, while bundle-disj invokes IMM s times with budget k for every invocation. So their overall running times differ. By contrast, the running time of greedyWM only depends on the maximum budget and is independent of the number of items. E.g., when number of items is 10, greedyWM is about 8 times faster than bundle-disj and 2.5 times faster than item-disj.
Experiment with real parameters
In this section, we conduct experiments on parameters (value, price, and noise) learned from real data. We consider the following 5 items: (1) Playstation 4, 500 GB console, denoted ps, (2) Controller of the Playstation, denoted c, and (3-5) Three different games compatible with ps, denoted g 1 , g 2 and g 3 respectively. We next describe the method by which we learn their parameters from real data. 6.4.1 Learning the price, value, and noise. Predicting a user's bid in an auction is a widely studied problem in auction theory. Jian et al. [21] showed that learning user's valuations of items improves the prediction accuracy. Given bidding history of an item, their method learns a value distribution of the item, by taking into account hidden/unobserved bids. Their experiments show that their method significantly improves upon the existing baselines in accurately learning valuation and estimating the bids.
We use their method to learn the values of itemsets from bidding histories. Recall that in our model we do not use value as a random variable, instead using noise to model the randomness in valuations. Hence we take the mean of the learned distribution to be the value and the noise is set to have 0 mean and the same variance as the learnt distribution. While EPIC does not assume specific noise distributions, we fit a gaussian distribution to noise for concreteness. We take 10, 000 independent random samples from the learnt distribution and fit a gaussian distribution on the sampled values. We mine the bidding histories of different itemsets from eBay. The prices of items are mined from Craigslist and Facebook groups of used products. Since the items bade in eBay are typically used products, to match them with the right price information, we use Craigslist and Facebook groups.
The price obtained for ps is C$260, for c is C$20 and for g 1 , g 2 and g 3 it is C$5 each. We show some of the learned parameters of different itemsets and links to the corresponding bidding histories used in learning, in Table 5 . We describe the parameters of the rest of the itemsets here. Firstly, any of c, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , without the core item ps, is useless. Hence values of those items are set to 0. Secondly, we did not find any bidding record for an itemset consisting of ps, c and a single game. This is perhaps because typically owners of ps own multiple games and while selling they sell all the games together with ps. Hence, we consider the itemset with ps, c and a single game to have negative deterministic utility. However, as the table shows, itemsets with ps, c and two games have non-negative deterministic utility. Finding the bidding history for the exact same games is difficult, so since games g 1 -g 3 are priced similarly and valued similarly by users, we assume that any itemset with ps, c and any two games has the same utility as shown in the fourth row of Table 5 . Lastly, notice that the only itemsets that have positive deterministic utility are itemsets with ps, c and at least two games. All other itemsets including the singleton items, have negative deterministic utility. Consequently, we know that the allocation produced by item-disj will have 0 expected social welfare, so we omit item-disj from our experiments, discussed next. 6.4.2 Results. As stated above, we compare greedyWM with bundle-disj in the following experiments. First we study the effect of total budget on the expected social welfare produced. Given a total budget, we assign 30%, 30%, 20%, 10%, 10% of that to ps, c, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 respectively. Then we vary the total budget from 100 to 500 in steps of 100. Fig. 7(a) shows the welfare: as can be seen, greedyWM outperforms bundle-disj in both high and low budgets. In fact with higher budget, greedyWM produces welfare 2 times more than bundle-disj. Next we report the running time of the two algorithms in Fig. 7(b) . Since bundle-disj makes multiple calls to IMM, its running time is 1.5 times higher than greedyWM.
Our final experiment is not a comparison of algorithms. Rather, it studies the following question. Suppose we have a fixed total budget which we must divide it up among various items. How would the social welfare and running time vary for different splits? Since we have seen that in terms of social welfare greedyWM dominates all baselines, we use it to measure the welfare. Given a total budget of 500, we split it across 10 items following three different budget distributions, namely (i) Uniform: each item has the same budget 50, (ii) Large skew: one item has 82% of the total budget and the remaining 18% is divided evenly among the remaining 9 items; and (iii) Moderate skew: Budgets of the 10 items are given by the budget vector b = [10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90] . Fig. 7(c) shows the expected social welfare and the running time of greedyWM under the three budget distributions. The welfare is the highest under uniform and worst under large skew, with moderate skew in between. Running time shows the opposite trend, with uniform being the fastest and large skew being the slowest. The findings are consistent with the observation that with large skew, the number of seeds to be selected increases and the allocation cannot take full advantage of supermodularity.
Summary & Discussion
In this paper, we combine viral marketing (influence maximization) with a framework of item adoption grounded in the economic principle of item utility, and propose an elegant, yet powerful model for capturing the interaction between these two paradigms. We study the novel problem of expected social welfare maximization, by focusing on a setting where valuations are supermodular and monotone w.r.t. sets of items. We show that the expected social welfare is monotone but neither submodular nor supermodular w.r.t.
allocations. Yet, we show that a simple greedy allocation guarantees an expected social welfare that is a (1 − 1/e − )-approximation to the optimum. To our knowledge, this is the first result of this kind for nonsubmodular function maximization in the context of viral marketing. The analysis needed to prove this result is highly non-trivial. Along the way, we develop a block accounting technique as well as an extension to the IMM algorithm, PRIMM, that can produce a (1 − 1/e − )-approximation to the optimal expected spread for the prefix-preserving IM problem. Both of these may be of independent interest. With extensive experiments on real and synthetic data, we show that our algorithm significantly outperforms the baselines.
While for expository reasons, we assumed IC model for propagation, our results and techniques carry over unchanged to any triggering model [24] . We assumed valuations to be user independent and modeled uncertainty in user valuations using zero mean random noise. We assumed that price is additive and valuations are supermodular. Other variants are equally compelling. E.g., submodular prices could naturally favor item bundling even more. In this case, utility remains supermodular and our results remain intact.
While supermodular valuations naturally model mutual complementarity between items, competition can be modeled using submodular valuations. Making one or both of valuations and noise user dependent would make the model more expressive. It is interesting to study the expected welfare maximization problem in these alternative settings. 
Proof. First, observe that U W (A) = V(A) − P(A) + N W (A), where −P(·) and N W (·) are both modular functions. Since V(·) is supermodular, it follows that U W (·) is supermodular as well. For any subset C ⊆ A∪B, we have
= U W (A ∪ B).
In the above derivation, Inequality (7) follows from applying supermodularity of U W on the first term, and applying local maximum of B on the second term, with the fact that B ∩ C ⊆ B; and Inequality (8) follows from applying supermodularity of U W on the first term, and applying local maximum of A on the second term, with the fact that C \ B ⊆ A. Lemma 3. Under a possible world W , for any allocation S, any node u's adoption set at any time t, A S W (u, t), is a local maximum with respect to U W . Proof. We prove this lemma by an induction on time t. Base Case: t = 1. Clearly, A S W (u, 1) = ∅ only for seed nodes u. By the diffusion model, A S W (u, 1) must have the maximum utility among all subsets of the desire set R S W (u, 1), so A S W (u, 1) is a local maximum w.r.t. U W . Induction: Assume the claim is true for t − 1, i.e., the adoption set t) ). W.l.o.g., assume C is local maximum. If it is not, we can always select the subset of items of C that has the highest utility. By definition, that subset is a local maximum and it will also be a subset of A S W (u, t). Clearly its utility is higher than that of C, and hence higher than U W (A S W (u, t)) as well. Now since A S W (u, t−1) and C are both local maxima, by Lemma 2, A S W (u, t−1)∪C is also a local maximum and t) ). This contradicts the adoption behavior of node u defined by our model:
which breaks supermodularity.
A.2 Proofs for Block Accounting (Section 5.2)
Proof. We first prove (a). If ∆ A i ≥ 0, then by the supermodularity of U W N (Lemma 1),
Then in the block generation process (Algorithm 2), set A i should be selected as the i-th block instead of B i , a contradiction. Now we prove (b). By the definition of blocks, we know that ∆ i ≥ 0. If A i is an empty block, then
Therefore, the lemma holds.
Proof. By definition of full blocks,
Since all blocks from A 1 to A i−1 are full blocks, we can rewrite it as util W (M | B 1 ∪ ... ∪ B i−1 ) ≥ 0. We can derive that M must contain at least one item from the set A i+1 ∪ ... ∪ A t , otherwise, all items are only from A i , then M turns out to be a partial block having non-negative marginal utility, contradicting Lemma 5 (a).
Let B i be the full block corresponding to the partial block A i . We know that M appears in the sequence I, and M cannot be B i . if M appears before B i in I, then as per our block construction process M should be chosen as the i-th block, since util W (M | B 1 ∪ ... ∪ B i−1 ) ≥ 0. This contradicts with the fact that B i is the i-th block.
If M appears after B i in I, then at least one item of M has index at least as high as the highest indexed item in B i . Let this item of M be i 0 and its budget be b i0 . We know from the correspondence of index and budget that all items of B i has budget at least b i0 . Since i 0 is assigned to v, we know that v is part of top b i0 greedy nodes. As all items of B i have budgets at least b i0 , they should also be assigned to v, in the greedy allocation. Thus B i as a full block is assigned to v. This leads to a contradiction that A i is a partial block in the greedy allocation. Therefore the lemma holds. Lemma 7. Let S Grd be the greedy allocation obtained using Algorithm 1. Then the expected social welfare
Proof. By Lemma 6, in an effective seed node of block B i , block B i is offered with all previous blocks B 1 , ..., B i−1 . Thus the seed node always adopts B i (together with B 1 , . . . , B i−1 ). Moreover, by definition, no other seed nodes outside the set of effective seeds adopts B i or any other blocks B i+1 , . . . , B t . In other words, seed nodes only adopt full blocks and there are no partial blocks adopted at any seed node. Then by Lemma 4, we know that each adopted full block at the seed is propagated together. In particular, all items in each block B i always propagate together, and there is no other way for a node to adopt block B i . Thus the expected number of nodes that are reached by block B i and consequently adopt B i , is σ(S GrdE Bi ). Moreover, each adoption of B i by any node contributes exactly ∆ i to the social welfare because all B 1 , ..., B i−1 must also be present. Then we have ρ W N (S Grd ) = i∈[t] σ(S GrdE Bi ) · ∆ i . Lemma 8. Let B i be an over budgeted block, B j (j < i) be the anchor block of B i , and a i be the anchor item of B i in B j . During the diffusion process from the seed allocation S, let A be the set of items in B j ∪ . . . ∪ B i that have been adopted by v by time t. If v has not yet adopted the anchor item a i by time t and A = ∅, then
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, that U W N (A | B 1 . . . , B j−1 ) ≥ 0. By the definition of the anchor item, we know that all items in A \ B j has strictly larger budget than the budget of a i , otherwise one of items in A \ B j should be the anchor for B i . This means all items in A \ B j has index strictly lower than a i . By definition a i is not in A, and thus all items in A ∩ B j also have index strictly lower than a i . Then by the block generation process, A should appear before B j in sequence I. Since U W N (A | B 1 . . . , B j−1 ) ≥ 0, the block generation process should select A as the j-th block instead of the current B j , a contradiction.
Lemma 9. For any arbitrary seed allocation S, the expected social welfare in W N is ρ W N (S) ≤ i∈[t] σ(S ai )· ∆ i , where S ai is the seed set assigned to the anchor item a i of block B i , and ∆ i is as defined in Eq. (2).
Proof.
For an edge possible world W E , suppose that after the diffusion process under W E , every node v
where the expectation is taken over the randomness of the edge possible worlds, and thus we use subscript W E under the expectation sign to make it explicit. By switching the summation signs and the expectation sign in the last equality above, we show that the expected social welfare can be accounted as the summation among all blocks B i of the expected marginal gain of block B i on all nodes. We next bound E W E v∈V ∆ Av i for each block B i . Under the edge possible world W E , for each v ∈ V , there are three possible cases for A v,i . In the first case, A v,i = ∅. In this case, ∆ Av i = 0, so we do not need to count the marginal gain ∆ Av i . In the second case, A v,i is not empty but it does not co-occur with block B i 's anchor a i , that is a i ∈ A v , and A v,i = ∅. In this case, Let A = A ∩ (B j ∪ . . . ∪ B i ), where B j is the anchor block of B i . Then A is not empty. By Lemma 8,
j , This means that the cumulative marginal gain of ∆ Av j with j ≤ j ≤ i is negative, so we can relax them to 0, effectively not counting the marginal gain of ∆ Av i either. In the third case, A v,i is non-empty and co-occur with its anchor a i , i.e. a i ∈ A and A v,i = ∅. Under this case, by Lemma 5 (b), ∆ Av i ≤ ∆ i , and so we relax ∆ Av i to ∆ i . This relaxation would occur only on nodes v that adopts a i . By the EPIC model, for an individual item a i , v could adopt a i only when there is path in W E from a seed node that adopts a i to node v. As defined in the lemma, S ai is the set of seed nodes that are assigned a i . Let Γ(S ai , W E ) be the set of nodes that are reachable from S ai in W E . Then, there are at most |Γ(S ai , W E )| nodes at which we relax ∆ Av i to ∆ i for block B i . This means that
Furthermore, notice that E W E [|Γ(S ai , W E )|] = σ(S ai ), by the live-edge representation of the IC model. Therefore, together with Eq. (9) and (10), we have
This concludes the proof of the lemma. For an arbitrary allocation S, since a i is the anchor item of B i , by its definition we know that |S ai | = |S GrdE Bi |. By the correctness of the prefix-preserve influence maximization algorithm we use in line 2 (Definition 1, to be instantiated in §5.3), we have that with probability at least 1− 1 |V | , σ(S GrdE Bi ) ≥ (1− 1 e − )σ(S ai ), for all blocks B i 's and their corresponding anchors a i 's.
Let the distribution of world W N be D N . Then, together with Lemma 9, we have that with probability at least 1 − 1 |V | ,
A.3 Proofs for Item-wise prefix preserving IMM (Section 5.3)
Lemma 10. Let R be the final set of RR sets generated by PRIMM at the end and let k ∈ b be any budget.
Then |R| ≥ λ * k /OPT k holds with probability at least 1 − 1/n . Proof. Given x ∈ [1, n], and δ 3 ∈ (0, 1) and a budget k. Let S k be the seed set of size k obtained by invoking NodeSelection(R, k), where,
|R| ≥
(2 + 2 3 ) · (log n k + log(1/δ 3 )) · n x .
Then, from Lemma 6 of [43] , if OPT k < x, then n·F R (S k ) < (1+ )·x with probability at least (1−δ 3 ). Now let j = log 2 n OPT k . By union bound, we can infer that PRIMM has probability at most (j − 1)/(n · log 2 n) to satisfy the coverage condition of line 14 for the budget k. Then by Lemma 7 of [43] and the union bound, PRIMM will satisfy LB k ≤ OPT k with probability at least 1 − n . We know that for any k ∈ b, |R| ≥ λ * k /LB k , hence the lemma follows. We are now ready to prove the correctness of PRIMM.
Lemma 11. PRIMM returns a prefix preserving (1−1/e− )-approximate solution S b to the optimal expected spread, with probability at least 1 − 1/n .
Proof. We know from Lemma 10 that the RR set sampling for any budget can result in the coverage condition (Algorithm 3, line 14) failing with probability at most 1/n . By applying union bound over all the budgets, we have that the failure probability of the coverage condition in PRIMM is at most k∈ b 1/n = | b| · 1/n . By setting = log n (n · | b|), we bound this failure probability to at most 1/n . That is, by using , for computing α and β k in Eq. (4), we know the following from Theorem 1 of [43] : from the solution S b returned by the final node selection of PRIMM (line 26), for every budget b i ∈ b, we can choose the prefix of top-b i nodes and use that as a solution S bi for that budget, with the guarantee that with probability at least 1 − 1/n each S bi is a (1 − 1/e − )-approximate solution to OPT bi . By union bound, PRIMM returns a (1 − 1/e − )-approximate prefix preserving solution with probability at least 1 − 2/n .
Finally by increasing to +log 2/ log n in line 2, we raise PRIMM's probability of success to 1−1/n .
E[|R|]
= max k∈ b {E[|R k |]} = O((b + )n log n · −2 /OPT min ).
For an RR set R ∈ R, let w(R) denote the number of edges in G pointing to nodes in R. If EP T is the expected value of w(R), then we know, n · EP T ≤ m · OPT min [44] . Hence using Eq. (12), the expected total time to generate R is determined by, 
Using Lemma 11 and Eq. (13) we now prove the correctness and the running time result of PRIMM.
Theorem 5. PRIMM is prefix preserving and returns a (1 − 1/e − )-approximate solution to IM with at least 1 − 1/n probability in O((b + + log n | b|)(n + m) log n · −2 ) expected time.
Proof. From Lemma 11, we have that PRIMM returns a prefix preserving (1 − 1/e − )-approximate solution with at least 1−1/n probability. In that process PRIMM invokes NodeSelection, log 2 n−1 times in the while loop and once to find the final seed set S b . Note that, we intentionally avoid redundant calls to NodeSelection when we switch budgets, which saves | b| additional calls to NodeSelection. Let R i be the susbset of R used in the i-th iteration of the loop. Since NodeSelection involves one pass over all RR set, on a given input R i , it takes O( R∈Ri |R|) time. Recall |R i | doubles with every increment of i. Hence it is a geometric sequence with a common ratio of 2. Now from Theorem 3 of [43] and the fact that there is no additional calls to NodeSelection during budget switch, we have total cost of invoking all NodeSelection is O(E[ R∈R |R|]).
Since |R| ≤ w(R), for any R ∈ R, then using Eq. (13) Hence the theorem follows.
Finally, the combination of Theorems 4 and 5 gives our main Theorem 3.
A.4 Proofs for Experiments (Section 6)
Lemma 12. The value function of Configuration 10 is supermodular.
Proof. First we show that for an itemset A t at level t, and an item i / ∈ A t , V(i | A t ) ≥ V(i | B), where B ⊂ A t is any subset of A t . We prove this claim by induction on level. Base Case: Let t = 1 and A 1 be any singleton itemset. Then V(i | A 1 ) = V(i | ∅) + ≥ V(i | ∅). Induction: Suppose the claim is true for all levels t ≤ l. We show it holds for t = l + 1. From our method of assigning values we have, V(i | A l+1 ) = max B l ∈P(I,l) {V(i | B l )} + , where P(I, l) is the set of all itemsets at level l. Thus V(i | A l+1 ) ≥ V(i | B l ). By induction hypothesis, V(i | B l ) ≥ V(i | B), for any subset B ⊂ B l , and thus V(i | A l+1 ) ≥ V(i | B).
It then follows that for any itemsets B ⊂ A ⊂ I and item i ∈ I \ A, V(i | A) ≥ V(i | B). Hence value is supermodular.
Lemma 13. The value function of Configuration 10 is well defined.
B Additional experiments
First we show the social welfare produced by RR-SIM + , RR-CIM, item-disj, bundle-disj and greedyWM in Configurations 1 and 4 that we omitted in Section 6.2. Fig. 8 (a) and (b) show the results for Configurations 1 and 4 respectively. The trend is similar to Fig. 3 of Section 6.2. greedyWM dominates all the baselines, however RR-CIM produces similar social welfare to greedyWM because it ends up copying the seeds. In Configuration 1, item-disj produces 0 social welfare, whereas in Configuration 4, item-disj and bundle-disj are equivalent. Fig. 8 (c) shows the effect of budget skew on the social welfare and running time of greedyWM, in Configuration 7. Recall the goal of this experiment is to understand how dividing up a fixed total budget among various items can impact the social welfare and running time. Hence we do not compare any algorithms and simply use greedyWM as a representative social welfare maximization algorithm, in our tests. The three different budget distributions are same as that of Section 6.4, namely (i) Uniform: each item has the same budget 50, (ii) Large skew: one item has 82% of the total budget (i.e. 500) and the remaining 18% is divided evenly among the remaining 9 items; and (iii) Moderate skew: Budgets of the 10 items are given by the budget vector b = [10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90] . Again the welfare is the highest under uniform and lowest under large skew, with moderate skew in between. W.r.t. the running, uniform is the fastest and large skew is the slowest. The findings are consistent with the observation on the real parameter experiments in Section 6.4. With large skew, the number of seeds to be selected increases and the allocation cannot take full advantage of supermodularity.
